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ABSTRACT 
Although highly automated vehicles (“HAVs”) have potential to reduce 
deaths and injuries from traffic crashes, product liability litigation for 
design defects in vehicles incorporating autonomous technology is 
inevitable. During the early stages of implementation, courts and juries 
will be forced to grapple with the application of traditional product 
liability principles to a never before experienced category of highly 
technical products. Recent decisions limiting the use of the consumer 
expectations test in cases involving complex products prompted the 
authors to examine more closely the history behind and the future 
viability of the consumer expectations test in HAV litigation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, more than 35,000 individuals died in vehicle crashes in the U.S. 
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) 
estimated that 94% of these deaths were attributable to human error.1 In 2017 
and 2018, in their own self-driving safety reports, General Motors and 
Waymo also noted that approximately 1.2 million lives are lost worldwide 
each year due to car crashes.2 Each of these entities further agree that highly 
automated vehicle (“HAV”)3 technology has the potential to reduce or 
 
 1. Automated Vehicles for Safety, NHTSA, https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-inn 
ovation/automated-vehicles-safety (last visited May 2, 2019). 
 2. WAYMO, WAYMO SAFETY REPORT: ON THE ROAD TO FULLY SELF-DRIVING 3 
(2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/sdc-prod/v1/safety-report/Safety%20Report%20 
2018.pdf; GENERAL MOTORS, 2018 SELF-DRIVING SAFETY REPORT 3 (2018), https://ww 
w.gm.com/content/dam/company/docs/us/en/gmcom/gmsafetyreport.pdf. 
 3. For purposes of this paper, the terms highly automated vehicle (HAV) or “self-
driving” will refer to vehicles defined by SAE Levels 4–5. See SAE INTERNATIONAL, 
TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS 
FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES J3016 (2018), https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/j3016 
_201806. The SAE levels of automation are as follows: (0) No automation; the vehicle 
has zero autonomy, and the driver performs all tasks; (1) Driver Assistance: the vehicle 
is controlled by the driver, but some driver assistance features are included; (2) Partial 
Driving Automation: the vehicle has combined automated functions, but the driver must 
remain engaged with the driving task and monitor the environment constantly; (3) 
Conditional Driving Automation: the driver is necessary, but is not required to constantly 
monitor the environment—the driver must be ready to take control of the vehicle at all 
times; (4) High Driving Automation: the vehicle is capable of performing all driving 
functions under certain conditions, but the driver has the option of controlling the 
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remove human error from the equation.4 Additional potential benefits 
include reduced traffic congestion; increased mobility options for currently 
underserved populations; and, increased comfort and a reduction in lost time 
during vehicle operation.5 Put simply, the stage is set for HAV technology 
to revolutionize the mobile world. 
During the implementation of HAVs, most sources agree that, due to their 
highly complex and technical nature, consumer education about the products 
will be key to successful and effective implementation. For its part, in the 
2017 update, Automated Driving Systems 2.0, NHTSA stated that 
“[E]ducation and training is imperative for increased safety during the 
deployment of [HAVs],” and encourages the development of “consumer 
education and training programs to address the anticipated differences in the 
use and operation of [automated driving systems] from those of the 
conventional vehicles that the public owns and operates.”6 General Motors 
and Waymo echoed these sentiments in their respective self-driving safety 
reports with Waymo, in October 2017, even helping to launch – Let’s Talk 
Self-Driving - which it describes as “the world’s first public education 
campaign about fully self-driving vehicles.”7 Taking this one-step further, in 
2018, Ford provided its Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment Report – A Matter 
of Trust.8 In it, Ford makes clear “that the central challenge in the 
development of self-driving vehicles” is not the technology, but, instead, it 
is consumer trust in the “safety, reliability and experience that the technology 
will enable.”9 Ford reiterates this point stating about consumer education and 
training that, “[B]ringing self-driving vehicles to market will require a 
thoughtful and sustained effort to teach customers how they work, why 
they’re safe and how to use them.”10 
In light of this, questions remain, particularly with respect to liability, if, 
and when, an injury or death occurs in an HAV. The question of who is liable 
when a self-driving vehicle crashes has generated significant debate and 
 
vehicle; and (5) Full Driving Automation: the vehicle is capable of performing all driving 
functions under all conditions, with the driver having the option of controlling the 
vehicle. 
 4. See WAYMO, supra note 2; GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2. 
 5. GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2. 
 6. NHTSA, AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS: A VISION FOR SAFETY 2.0 15 (2017), 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/vehicle-manufacturers/automated-driving-systems#automated-
driving-systems-av-20. 
 7. WAYMO, supra note 2 at 30; GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2, at 32. 
 8. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A MATTER OF TRUST: FORD’S APPROACH TO 
DEVELOPING SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES, https://media.ford.com/content/dam/fordmedia/p 
df/ Ford_AV_LLC_FINAL_HR_2.pdf. 
 9. Id.at 3. 
 10. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
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conversation. Per NHTSA, “these are among many important questions 
beyond the technical considerations that policymakers are working to 
address before automated vehicles are made available.”11 NHTSA also posits 
that questions of liability pertaining to HAVs are something within the 
purview of each state to manage.12 In the wake of some interesting opinions 
in 2017, this question, and others, prompted the authors to examine the 
historical development of product defect theories and, in particular, whether 
the consumer expectations test can reasonably be applied to determine 
liability in cases involving complex products. 
II. ADOPTION OF DESIGN DEFECT TESTS IN THE WAKE OF SECTION 
402A OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 
In 1965, the law of torts and the field of product liability were altered 
dramatically by the adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.13 Section 402A sought to impose strict liability on the 
manufacturers or sellers of defective products, regardless of negligence, and 
became perhaps the most cited section of any Restatement of Law in legal 
jurisprudence.14 
A. The Consumer Expectations Test 
Section 402A provides that “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property 
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property . . . .”15 To guide courts in determining whether 
a product is unreasonably dangerous, the drafters of the Second Restatement 
included the following comment: “The article sold must be dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer 
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community 
as to its characteristics.”16 This comment provided support for the pure 
consumer expectations test in product defect cases. In turn, this product 
defect test was embraced by courts in the years following the release of the 
Second Restatement.17 Over time, courts across the country recognized that 
 
 11. Automated Vehicles for Safety, supra note 1. 
 12. NHTSA, supra note 6, at 24. 
 13. See generally George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2301 (1989). 
 14. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Proposed Revision of Section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 n.1 (1992). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 16. Id. at cmt. i. 
 17. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co., Inc., 268 N.W. 2d 830 (Iowa 
1978); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Estate of Pinkham v. 
Cargill, Inc., 55 A.3d 1 (Me. 2012) (citing Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 
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there were significant issues with the Second Restatement’s pure consumer 
expectations approach to defective design. 
For example, in the 1967 case of Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., the Supreme 
Court of Oregon was faced with application of the consumer expectations 
test in the context of a design defect claim involving a motor vehicle.18 In 
Heaton, the plaintiff’s vehicle struck a rock in the roadway. After the 
accident, the rim of the wheel was found to have separated from the rest of 
the wheel assembly. The court utilized the consumer expectations test to 
determine design defect, stating: 
 
In the type of case in which there is no evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, available to prove exactly what sort of 
manufacturing flaw existed, or exactly how the design was 
deficient, the plaintiff may nonetheless be able to establish his right 
to recover, by proving that the product did not perform in keeping 
with the reasonable expectations of the user. When it is shown that 
a product failed to meet the reasonable expectations of the user the 
inference is that there was some sort of defect.19 
 
However, the court recognized that in Heaton, the jury could not possibly 
state from their own experience what the expectations of the average 
consumer would be.20 After all, high-speed collisions with large rocks are 
not so common that the average person would know from personal 
experience how the wheel assembly would perform in such a situation.21 As 
such, “[t]he jury would therefore be unequipped, either by general 
background or by facts supplied in the record, to decide whether this wheel 
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected.”22 
Unfortunately, the Heaton court ultimately refused to acknowledge that the 
consumer expectations test simply did not apply in this situation, but instead 
seemed to suggest that expert testimony would be required to establish the 
consumer expectations.23 The paradox is obvious: if an expert is required to 
tell the consumer what to expect, is that truly the expectation of an ordinary 
consumer? 
Fortunately, courts have begun to recognize that utilizing the consumer 
expectations test in cases involving alleged design defects in technically 
 
940 (Me. 1982)); Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2008). 
 18. See Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967). 
 19. Id. at 471–72 (emphasis added). 
 20. See id. at 472–73. 
 21. Id. at 473. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 474. 
58 JOURNAL OF LAW AND MOBILITY 2019 
complex products is simply not workable.24 However, there are courts that 
have found the consumer expectations test applicable, even where the 
requisite knowledge is not within the purview of lay jurors.25 
B. Risk Utility Test 
As a result, many courts began to apply the test commonly referred to as 
risk-utility balancing. Under this test, to establish a prima facie case of design 
defect, the plaintiff must show that on balance, the utility of the challenged 
product design outweighs the risk of danger inherent in the design.26 
Traditionally, under risk-utility, courts consider a multitude of factors to 
determine whether a defect exists, including the following factors identified 
in an influential article by Dean John W. Wade in 1973: 
 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product; 
(2) the safety aspects of the product; 
(3) the availability of safer substitute products; 
(4) the possibility of elimination of dangerous characteristics of the 
product without impairing its usefulness; 
(5) the user’s ability to avoid danger by safe use of the product; 
(6) the anticipated dangers inherent in the product due to general 
knowledge or the existence of warnings; and 
(7) the possibility of loss-spreading by the manufacturer through 
price setting or insurance.27 
 
Further, “[t]he utility of the product must be evaluated from the point of view 
of the public as a whole, because a finding of liability for defective design 
could result in the removal of an entire product line from the market.”28 
In 1998, the element of a reasonable alternate design was written into the 
new Restatement (Third) of Torts.29 Under § 2 of the Third Restatement, a 
product is: 
 
 “[D]efective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed 
 
 24. See, e.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Camacho v. Honda Motor Corp., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246–48 (Colo. 1987)). See also 2 
LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY§ 11.03 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed.). 
 25. See, e.g., Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 451–52 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995). See also 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 25. 
 26. See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978). 
 27. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. 
L.J. 825 (1973). 
 28. See Thibault, 395 A.2d at 807. 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST., 1998). 
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by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption 
of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, 
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the 
omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe.30 
 
As noted in 2009, the “reasonable alternative design” standard of the Third 
Restatement ultimately came to embody the “risk-utility test” that is applied 
in the majority of United States jurisdictions today.31 
Significant developments since 2009, some of which are discussed more 
fully below, further exemplify the national trend towards applying risk-
utility in complex design defect cases and moving away from the consumer 
expectations test in this context. Indeed, in 2017, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that, “when the ultimate issue of design defect calls for a careful 
assessment of feasibility, practicality, risk, and benefit, the case should not 
be resolved simply on the basis of ordinary consumer expectations.”32 
C. Hybrid Test 
Other jurisdictions utilize a dual-approach to design defect claims. 
California, for example, utilizes the consumer expectations test when 
consumers are capable of developing expectations about the characteristics 
of a product from everyday use.33 For more complex products, where the 
characteristics are outside the knowledge of an everyday consumer, courts 
apply the risk-benefit test.34 Thus, the determinative issue in many cases in 
California and similar jurisdictions is whether a product is too complex or 
unfamiliar for average consumers to develop expectations, such that 
utilization of the consumer expectations test is improper.35 Making this 
determination in the context of autonomous technology should not be an 
issue. 
 
 30. Id. The Third Restatement explicitly rejects consumer expectations as an 
independent standard for determining design defect. See id. at §2 cmt. g. 
 31. See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturer Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1065 
(2009). Notably, even courts that continue to utilize the consumer expectations test 
exclusively often acknowledge that evidence of an alternative design is the most 
appropriate and useful means of showing that a product is unreasonably dangerous. See, 
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 655 (Nev. 2017). 
 32. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 683 Fed. App’x 610, 611 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (Cal. 1994)) (emphasis 
supplied in original). 
 33. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 310–311. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See, e.g., Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 160–61 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
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This hybrid approach combines elements of both the consumer 
expectations test and the risk-utility test. One example is the “either-or” 
concept, which posits that: 
 
[A] product is defective in design either (1) if the product has failed 
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when 
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in 
light of the relevant factors . . . the benefits of the challenged design 
do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design.36 
 
This approach allows courts more flexibility in applying the appropriate test 
based upon all of the relevant circumstances. For example, in Barker v. Lull 
Engineering, the plaintiff sustained injuries while operating a loader at a 
construction site and alleged that his injuries were caused by a defective 
design of the product because it was not equipped with a roll bar or seat 
belts.37 The California Supreme Court rejected a pure consumer expectations 
test and a pure risk-utility test, instead articulating the two-prong test 
allowing a plaintiff to establish a design defect through either test.38 In so 
holding, the court noted the benefits of the more flexible approach stating: 
 
[I]t subjects a manufacturer to liability whenever there is something 
“wrong” with a product’s design – either because the product fails 
to meet ordinary consumer expectations as to safety or because, on 
balance, the design is not as safe as it should be – while stopping 
short of making the manufacturer an insurer for all injuries which 
may result from the use of its product. This test, moreover, 
explicitly focuses on the trier of fact’s attention to the adequacy of 
the product itself, rather than on the manufacturer’s conduct, and 
places the burden on the manufacturer, rather than the plaintiff, to 
establish that because of the complexity of, and trade-offs implicit 
in, the design process, an injury-producing product should 
nevertheless not be found defective.39 
 
Other courts have taken a different approach in formulating a hybrid 
consumer expectations and risk-utility test, incorporating risk-utility factors 
into the consumer expectation analysis, and vice versa.40 For example, in 
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., the plaintiffs alleged that pneumatic 
 
 36. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978). 
 37. Id. at 447–48. 
 38. Id. at 455–56. 
 39. Id. at 456. 
 40. See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333–34 (Conn. 
1997). 
 LET’S BE REASONABLE 61 
hand tools manufactured by the defendant were defective in design because 
they exposed the plaintiffs to excessive vibration, resulting in injuries to the 
plaintiffs.41 Although Connecticut courts had long applied the Second 
Restatement’s consumer expectations test, the court recognized that “there 
may be instances involving complex product designs in which an ordinary 
consumer may not be able to form expectations of safety.”42 In recognizing 
this issue with the pure consumer expectations test, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court adopted a “modified consumer expectation test, provid[ing] the jury 
with the product’s risks and utility and then inquir[ing] whether a reasonable 
consumer would consider the product unreasonably dangerous.”43 In 
determining a consumer’s reasonable expectations, the jury should consider 
various factors, including but not limited to the “relative cost of the product, 
the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and 
feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk.”44 In sum, under this 
approach, “the consumer expectation test would establish the product’s risks 
and utility, and the inquiry would then be whether a reasonable consumer 
would consider the product design unreasonably dangerous.”45 The 
Connecticut Supreme Court’s approach was based, in part, on early drafts of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts on Product Liability.46 
III. MORE AND MORE COURTS ARE RECOGNIZING THE LIMITATIONS 
OF THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST IN COMPLEX DESIGN DEFECT 
CASES. 
In March 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
examined the question of whether the consumer expectations test or risk-
utility balancing test should be applied to determine whether a design defect 
existed in a product liability case involving vehicle roof deformation.47 In 
Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiffs claimed that the roof of their 
vehicle was defectively designed because it deformed inward eight inches 
into the passenger compartment during a multiple rollover event. The 
plaintiffs alleged that a properly designed roof should have resulted in less 
than three inches of deformation in the subject crash. 
The Edwards plaintiffs sought to prove design defect by showing that the 
roof did not perform as the average consumer would have expected. Ford 
filed a motion contending that the jury should be instructed on the risk-utility 
 
 41. Id. at 1325. 
 42. Id. at 1333. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1331. 
 47. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 683 Fed. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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test alone. Ford’s motion was granted and plaintiffs appealed. The Ninth 
Circuit held that the risk-utility test was the proper test to be applied, 
specifically recognizing the “lack of consumer expectations regarding the 
extent to which the [vehicle]’s roof would crush in a multiple rollover 
accident.”48 The Ninth Circuit went on to note that “[d]rivers’ everyday 
experiences do not allow for the formulation of reasonable expectations as 
to the degree that a vehicle’s roof should crush during a rollover.”49 The 
Ninth Circuit did not feel it necessary to state whether or not this product 
was too complex for the consumer expectations test to govern; instead, it was 
enough to know that consumers simply would not have expectations related 
to roof performance in a rollover.50 Thus, the risk-utility test was the 
appropriate test.51 
Another recent case decided by the Court of Appeal of California also 
limited the applicability of the consumer expectations test. The plaintiff in 
Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson contracted a rare condition known as SJS/TEN 
as a reaction to taking over-the-counter ibuprofen produced by Johnson & 
Johnson. Plaintiff sought to show that the drug was defectively designed 
through utilization of the consumer expectations test. 
The Court of Appeal found the consumer expectations had no place in 
proving design defect under these facts, noting that “‘[t]he consumer 
expectations test is reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of 
the product’s users permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated 
minimum safety assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert 
opinion about the merits of the design.’”52 The plaintiff essentially attempted 
to use consumer expectations to avoid having to confront the more difficult 
risk-utility standard or any showing of a reasonable alternative design, but 
also wished to introduce expert testimony to establish that the ibuprofen did 
not meet consumer expectations. The court found this fact alone sufficient to 
demonstrate the consumer expectations test was inappropriate for that case.53 
Succinctly explaining the problem with applying consumer expectations 
in the case of complex products or products with which consumers are 
unfamiliar, the court stated: “[I]t could be said that any injury from the 
intended or foreseeable use of a product is not expected by the ordinary 
 
 48. Id. at 611. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id.; See also Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E. 2d 5, 13–14 (S.C. 2010) 
(finding that the consumer expectations test was not appropriate in design defect case 
after examining the issue in the context of an automotive rollover case involving an 
allegedly defective seatbelt design). 
 51. See id. 
 52. Trejo v. Johnson & Johnson, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) 
(quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994). 
 53. See id. at 168. 
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consumer. If this were the end of the inquiry, the consumer expectations test 
always would apply and every product would be found to have a design 
defect.”54 
As to a non-complex product, the Tenth Circuit’s examination of 
consumer expectations in Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc. is instructive.55 Kokins 
involved the determination of what design defect test should be used under 
Colorado law in the context of a claim involving a metal marine cable, a 
seemingly simple product. The court initially noted that, under Colorado law, 
the risk-utility test and consumer expectations test are not mutually exclusive 
of each other and can sometimes even be applied in the same case.56 
However, the Tenth Circuit held that in the context of this particular product, 
only the risk-utility test was proper, due to the technical and specific 
information related to metallic corrosion.57 Quite simply, in cases where 
technical and scientific issues predominate, use of the consumer expectations 
test, alone or in conjunction with the risk-utility test, is inappropriate.58 
Finally, as recently as November, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court 
determined that the “risk-benefit test is the appropriate test to assess whether 
a product was unreasonably dangerous due to a design defect when . . . the 
dangerousness of the design is ‘defined primarily by technical, scientific 
information.’”59 In Walker v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff proceeded to trial 
against Ford for injuries sustained in a rear-end impact.60 The plaintiff 
alleged the seat in his vehicle was defectively designed, alleging theories 
based in both strict liability and negligence.61 At the end of trial, the trial 
court instructed the jury that it could apply either a consumer expectation test 
or risk-benefit test, and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff.62 The court of 
appeals reversed the jury verdict.63 
In affirming the Colorado Court of Appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court 
recognized that it had “stated repeatedly that the risk-benefit test, not the 
consumer expectation test, is the proper test to use in assessing whether a 
product like the car seat . . . is unreasonably dangerous due to a design 
 
 54. See id. at 167 (emphasis added). 
 55. See Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 56. See id. at 1297. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 406 P.3d 845, 850 (Colo. 2017) (quoting Ortho 
Paharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986)). 
 60. See id. at 847–48. 
 61. See id. at 848. 
 62. See id. at 848. 
 63. See id. at 849. 
64 JOURNAL OF LAW AND MOBILITY 2019 
defect.”64 The Court further noted: 
 
[P]roducts-liability law has developed in part to “encourage 
manufacturers to use information gleaned from testing, inspection 
and data analysis” to help avoid product accidents. Using the risk-
benefit test . . . helps further this objective, as it directs the fact-
finders to consider the manufacturer’s ability to minimize or 
eliminate risks and the effect such an alteration would have on the 
product’s utility, other safety aspects, or affordability.65 
 
While the authors recognize the debate about whether to apply the consumer 
expectations test or the risk-utility test continues to this day, and that some 
jurisdictions still apply the consumer expectations test, even in cases of 
complex products, the above referenced opinions illustrate the issues and 
concerns with asking jurors to determine the expectations of an ordinary 
consumer when evaluating a highly technical products in design defect 
matters. 
IV. THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE 
TEST OF DESIGN DEFECT AS APPLIED TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY 
The arrival of any new product technology will bring with it litigation, and 
along with that arguments for the legal standard that will place the lightest 
burden on plaintiffs in this new arena. Thus, it is likely that as lawsuits begin 
with autonomous vehicle technology, plaintiffs will argue that the consumer 
expectations test should apply to their claims for alleged design defects in 
autonomous vehicles. The argument will likely follow the reasoning 
employed by courts that refuse to adopt the Third Restatement approach, or 
that still strictly follow the consumer expectations test, i.e. that risk-utility 
balancing, especially when a reasonable alternative design is required, places 
too great of a burden on plaintiffs that do not have the resources to make 
showings that are so technical in nature.66 
A. Highly Automated Vehicles Are Too Complex for Consumer 
Expectations to Govern. 
The Society of Automotive Engineers lists six (6) levels of automation for 
 
 64. Id. at 850. 
 65. Id. at 851 (quoting Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo. 
1987)). 
 66. See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 
1997); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001). 
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HAVs.67 Currently, all vehicles on roadways are levels one and two, with 
Audi unveiling the world’s first production Level 3 vehicle in July 2017.68 
Further, even if fully autonomous vehicles were on the road today, the vast 
majority of consumers will remain unfamiliar with the technology for the 
foreseeable future. Drivers keep their vehicles on the road for over eleven 
years on average,69 so vehicles of lower automation levels will continue to 
be the predominant means of automotive transportation for years to come.70 
Further, NHTSA acknowledges the lack of consumer experience with 
autonomous vehicle technology, as well as how different these vehicles are 
from conventional vehicles on the roads today. In 2017, in Automated 
Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety, NHTSA pronounced that: 
 
Proper education and training is imperative to ensure safe 
deployment of automated vehicles. Therefore, manufacturers and 
other entities should develop document, and maintain employee, 
dealer, distributor, and consumer education and training programs 
to address the anticipated differences in the use and operation of 
HAVs [highly automated vehicles] from those of conventional 
vehicles that the public owns and operates today. Such programs 
should be designed to provide the target users the necessary level 
of understanding to use these technologies properly, efficiently, and 
in the safest manner possible.71 
 
Essentially, NHTSA is recommending a completely new dimension of 
consumer education on how to use these products. Likewise, this education 
will be aimed at and received primarily by consumers who actually purchase 
and use autonomous vehicle technology and not automotive consumers 
generally. 
 
 67. See SAE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 3. 
 68. As reported in an article by IEEE Spectrum, Audi claims to have achieved level 
3 through its “AI Traffic Jam Pilot” feature, which can only be activated when driving at 
less than 37 mph. See Philip E. Ross, The Audi A8: The World’s First Production Car to 
Achieve Level 3 Autonomy, IEEE SPECTRUM (July 11, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/ca 
rs-that-think/transportation/self-driving/the-audi-a8-the-worlds-first-production-car-to-
achieve-level-3-autonomy. 
 69. Reno Charlton, American Drivers Keeping Cars on the Road for Longer: 
Average Age Now 11.4 Years, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2013), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/american-drivers-keeping_b_3718301?guccounter=1. 
 70. See Brian A. Browne, Self-Driving Cars: On the Road to a New Regulatory Era, 
8. J. L., TECH. & INTERNET 1, 3 (2017) (Giving examples of the various lower level 
features many OEMs have planned for the coming years). 
 71. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 24 
(2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guida 
nce%20PDF.pdf (emphasis added). 
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On this point, in a 2014 survey conducted by researchers at the University 
of Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute, Americans were asked, 
“[h]ow interested would you be in having a completely self-driving 
vehicle . . . as the vehicle you own or lease?” The most commonly chosen 
answer, comprising 33.7% of responses, was “not at all interested” with 
another 22.4% of respondents answering that they would be only “slightly 
interested.”72 This information suggests that not only are most Americans 
personally unfamiliar with HAVs, but that a majority of Americans will not 
become familiar with such vehicles any time soon. 
Another striking result of that survey was that, of Americans with Internet 
access, only 70.9% of respondents had even heard of autonomous or self-
driving vehicles.73 If these respondents were placed on a jury in a jurisdiction 
applying the consumer expectations test, roughly three of twelve jurors 
would be deciding liability based on the ordinary expectations of a consumer 
for a product about which they had never heard.  
Moreover, a study by various researchers in the MIT AgeLab suggests that 
naming conventions for autonomous or “advanced driver assistance 
systems” can influence the expectations that a consumer may have about 
these systems.74 In particular, the authors of this paper observed that: 
  
[D]rivers’ attitudes and beliefs about system capability and 
performance are known to influence their use of technology. 
Factors such as a driver’s prior experience with similar 
technologies, predisposed trusting tendencies, and attitudes formed 
from exposure to media and societal opinion might all contribute to 
a driver’s belief that a system can handle a task outside of its 
[operational design domain].75  
 
Further, the authors found that “the name of a driver assistance system also 
has the potential to impact their perceptions of system capability.”76 These 
same perceptions or misconceptions developed by unfamiliar consumers 
simply from the name of a particular system are sure to carry over to these 
 
 72. See BRANDON SCHOETTLE & MICHAEL SIVAK, PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT SELF-
DRIVING VEHICLES IN CHINA, INDIA, JAPAN, THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIA 16 (Univ. of Mich. 
Trans. Res. Inst. Report No. 2014-30, 2014), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/202 
7.42/109433 (emphasis added). 
 73. See id. at 5. 
 74. Hillary Abraham, et al., What’s in a Name: Vehicle Technology Branding & 
Consumer Expectations for Automation, AUTOMOTIVEUI ‘17 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMOTIVE USER INTERFACES AND INTERACTIVE 
VEHICULAR APPLICATION 226-234 (2017), available at http://st.sigchi.org/publications/ 
toc/auto-ui-2017.html. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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consumers ability to judge the systems if called upon in a legal setting. 
This is important because, while the consumer expectation test is intended 
to be an objective test that is applied based on the ordinary consumer’s 
expectation, the gravamen of the test is that “the everyday experience of the 
product’s users permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated 
minimum safety assumptions . . . .”77 At least initially, and most likely for 
quite a period thereafter, the average juror will simply not possess the 
everyday experience necessary to properly assess the product in a consumer 
expectations analysis. Rather, it is much more appropriate and fair to aid a 
jury by allowing the greater body of evidence encompassed within a risk-
utility analysis. 
B. Consumer Expectations of Autonomous Vehicle Technology are 
Inconsistent and Unrealistic at this Point. 
Even when consumer expectations are drawn broadly (i.e., safe versus 
unsafe), instead of in terms of how a particular aspect of an autonomous 
vehicle should perform at a technical level, consumer expectations at this 
point in time have not reached any kind of meaningful consistency. For 
example, many consumers are highly skeptical of new HAV technology and 
believe that the technology is inherently unsafe.78 On the other hand, some 
organizations anticipate large reductions in automotive accidents and 
injuries as a result of this new technology and propound this message to the 
general public.79 For its part, NHTSA helped promote the narrative that the 
promise of self-driving vehicles will lead to a marked increase in automotive 
safety, noting in their 2017 update that, “in the transportation sector, where 
9 out of 10 serious roadway crashes occur due to human behavior, automated 
vehicle technologies possess the potential to save thousands of lives, as well 
as reduce congestion, enhance mobility, and improve productivity.”80 Some 
manufacturers are no different: in GM’s 2018 Self-Driving Safety Report, the 
manufacturer optimistically stated that as a result of self-driving technology, 
they “envision a future with zero crashes.”81 
Further, HAV manufacturers, eager to explain the admittedly 
revolutionary technology their vehicles employ, may inadvertently present 
 
 77. See Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 683 Fed. App’x 610, 611 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305, 308 (Cal. 1994)). 
 78. Jeremy Hsu, 75 Percent of U.S. Drivers Fear Self-Driving Cars, But It’s an Easy 
Fear to Get Over, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 7, 2016, 15:01 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/ 
cars-that-think/transportation/self-driving/driverless-cars-inspire-both-fear-and-hope. 
 79. See, e.g., MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, MADD STATEMENT ON 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY LEGISLATION, (October 4, 2017), https://www.ma 
dd.org/press-release/madd-statement-autonomous-vehicle-technology-legislation/. 
 80. NHTSA, supra note 6, at ii. 
 81. GENERAL MOTORS, supra note 2 at 3 (emphasis added). 
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consumers with the impression that these vehicles truly can do no wrong. 
Consider the following language from Delivering Safety: Nuro’s Approach: 
 
Our vehicle is engineered to be safer than nearly any other – it 
is lighter than a passenger vehicle, narrower and more nimble, and 
operates at lower speeds. This approach gives us more time to react, 
shortens our stopping distance, and provides an additional safety 
buffer to the side of the vehicle. Together, these advantages help 
prevent accidents that standard vehicles cannot avoid, such as 
someone jumping out from between parked cars or swerving across 
the road.82 
 
It is certainly true that HAV technology will revolutionize automotive safety 
overall. However, these types of statements may lead many consumers to 
believe that autonomous vehicles should perform to the point of infallibility, 
which is simply not possible, especially at this early stage of development. 
For example, on May 7, 2016, a driver of a Tesla Model S was killed when 
the driver collided with a tractor-trailer who was crossing an uncontrolled 
intersection.83 The vehicle’s data resulted in three important findings:  
 
(1) That the Tesla was being driven in autopilot mode at the time 
of the accident; 
(2) the automatic emergency braking (AEB) system did not 
automatically brake or warn to avoid the collision, and;  
(3) that the driver did not take any preventive steps, i.e. braking or 
steering, to avoid the collision.84 
 
Because of the accident, both the National Transportation Safety Board 
(“NTSB”) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) through their Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) conducted 
investigations.85 
For example, the ODI investigated: (1) the AEB system design and 
performance; (2) human-machine interfaces related to operating in autopilot 
mode; (3) additional accident data regarding Tesla’s autopilot and AEB 
 
 82. Nuro, Delivering Safety: Nuro’s Approach 8 (2019), https://tonnietal 
ler.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/d5d69-delivering_safety_nuros_approach.pdf. 
 83. NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, available at https://static.n 
htsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.pdf. 
 84. NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 83, at 1. 
 85. See NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 83; see also 
NTSB, NTSB/HAR-17/02, COLLISION BETWEEN A CAR WITH AUTOMATED VEHICLE 
CONTROL SYSTEMS AND A TRACTOR-SEMITRAILER TRUCK (2017), available at 
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR1702.pdf. 
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systems; and, (4) the changes if any Tesla has made to such autopilot and 
AEB systems.86 The result of the investigation was that there were no defects 
in the design or performance of the autopilot or AEB systems in the vehicles 
studied – nor was there a situation to which the systems did not perform as 
designed.87 
Given the situation, is it reasonable to task an “ordinary consumer” with 
properly determining whether the AEB and autopilot systems are in fact 
functioning properly or improperly? Compare the reported results of the 
investigations by NHTSA’s ODI and the NTSB with the statements by 
Forbes contributor, Brad Templeton, in his article, “Tesla Autopilot Repeats 
Fatal Crash; Do They Learn From Past Mistakes?”88 To wit, Templeton 
posits, “Even so, most would hope the Tesla Autopilot would have detected 
the truck crossing in front of it, which appeared not to happen. No braking 
or evasive actions were taken. The Autopilot was engaged just 10 seconds 
before the collision.”89 He further opines: 
 
As such, having already had a fatality from (the old system’s) 
failure to identify the broad side of a transport trailer, that would 
have to be very high on the list of the sort of thing they would want 
their fleet to find and identify for them, so they can confirm it never 
fails to perceive a crossing truck. Somehow, it still failed. Of all 
the things you would expect Tesla to identify, these few things 
which resulted in fatal accidents, like a truck side and a 
highway crash attenuator, should be at the very top of the list.90 
 
Although Templeton is likely more informed than the ordinary consumer, 
the opinions expressed in his article and the conclusions reached by the 
NHTSA and NTSB are in clear contradiction of one another. Thus, when 
considering the expectations of the everyday consumer, it is clear the 
necessary information is simply not available to conduct investigations such 
as the one carried out by the ODI or the NTSB, which can take months of 
analysis and result in sixty-three-page accident reports, and ultimately 
determine what actually occurred. 
Similar to the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Trejo that the 
consumer expectations test could lead to virtually unlimited liability in cases 
of complex products, the current climate of high expectations regarding 
 
 86. See NHTSA OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 83, at 1. 
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HAVs would likely mean that a HAV manufacturer would lose every time 
when the consumer applications test is applied. Consumers will expect that 
HAVs should avoid accidents one hundred percent of the time, so any time 
one of these vehicles is involved in an accident, it has already failed the 
consumer expectations test. This type of res ipsa loquitur conclusion 
undermines the concept of design defects in products liability law and would 
allow plaintiffs to completely sidestep the requirement of a showing that an 
HAV was in fact defective, effectively making manufacturers of HAVs 
insurers of those products’ safety.91 In essence, plaintiffs would no longer 
bear the burden of making a showing of product defect. 
Further, much of an individual consumer’s expectations about the way a 
vehicle should perform in an accident scenario are shaped by the behavior of 
other drivers.92 Without the traditional feedback from other drivers to which 
consumers are accustomed, these expectations are wholly lacking to describe 
how autonomous vehicle technology will perform in an accident situation.93 
As noted in a report issued by the University of Michigan’s Transportation 
Research Institute, “[t]he degree of importance of both driver expectations 
and feedback from other drivers, and the consequent effects on the safety of 
a traffic system containing both conventional and self-driving vehicles, 
remain to be ascertained.”94 
V. POLICY REASONS FOR NOT APPLYING THE CONSUMER 
EXPECTATIONS TEST TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY. 
As noted, autonomous vehicle technology has the potential to decrease 
traffic injuries and deaths.95 By applying the consumer expectations test, in 
which unknowledgeable consumers are not required to take into account the 
utility of a product, or the possibility of a feasible alternative design, courts 
could expose manufacturers to significant uncertainty in product liability 
litigation. If the standard by which a product will be judged is on the 
unpredictable expectations of consumers in such a complex and changing 
technology, rather than by demonstration of the product’s utility, the 
threshold for deployment by a manufacturer may change: 
 
 
 91. See Funkhouser v. Ford Motor Co., 736 S.E.2d 309, 314–15 (Va. 2013) (noting 
that in failure to warn cases, as well as in products liability cases, removal of the defect 
requirement could allow plaintiffs to attribute any generalized danger to a manufacturer 
without any showing of defect in that product). 
 92. See MICHAEL SIVAK & BRANDON SCHOETTLE, ROAD SAFETY WITH SELF-
DRIVING VEHICLES: GENERAL LIMITATIONS AND ROAD SHARING WITH CONVENTIONAL 
VEHICLES 5 (Univ. of Mich. Trans. Res. Inst. Report No. 2015-2, 2015). 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. (emphasis added). 
 95. See, e.g., MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, supra note 79. 
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Thus, even though an autonomous vehicle may be safer overall than 
a conventional vehicle, it will shift the responsibility for accidents, 
and hence liability, from drivers to manufacturers. The shift will 
push the manufacturer away from the socially optimal outcome—
to develop the autonomous vehicle.96 
 
To the contrary, under a risk-utility analysis, particularly one that requires 
proof of a safer, practicable alternative design, automotive manufacturers 
will be able to show that the societal benefits from the use of HAV 
technology as opposed to other technologies outweigh the risk of individual 
malfunctions in individual cases.97 
Consider the following example that illustrates the possible effect of 
unbridled consumer expectations on the introduction of beneficial new 
technology: 
 
Suppose . . . that a particular type of “autobrake” crash-avoidance 
technology works to prevent crashes 80 percent of the time. The 
other 20 percent of the time, however, the technology does not work 
and the crash occurs as it would have in the absence of the 
technology. Victims in those crashes may sue the manufacturer and 
argue that the product was defective because it failed to operate 
properly in their crashes. Under existing liability doctrine, they 
have a plausible argument: The product did not work as 
designed . . . . A manufacturer facing the decision whether to 
employ such a technology in its vehicles might very well decide not 
to, purely on the basis of expected liability costs.98 
 
Without any balancing of the utility of these vehicles or the requirement of 
a reasonable alternative design, it would be possible, even reasonable, for 
juries applying the consumer expectations test to find defective design every 
time. This will be especially true in situations such as those involving self-
driving vehicle technology, since consumers tend to have unrealistic 
expectations about the benefits of this new technology as a whole.99 
Further, the consumer expectations test will not allow for consideration of 
non-safety related societal benefits that HAV technology provides, since the 
only consideration will be on whether the product performed as expected in 
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that one instance. The average American commuter spends about one week 
of his or her life in traffic each year—a statistic that HAV manufacturers 
have set their sights on reducing.100 The potential time saved by commuters 
on the whole is not a factor that would be considered under the consumer 
expectations test. 
Another benefit of HAV technology outside of the realm of safety is the 
potential for added mobility for those who cannot currently drive.101 
According to a report from NHTSA, 3 million Americans are blind or suffer 
from poor vision.102 Further, 79 percent of Americans over the age of 65 live 
in car-dependent communities.103 The independence these communities 
could gain with the widespread use of HAV technology would be yet another 
consideration the jury could not take into account when utilizing the 
consumer expectations test. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts should reject the consumer expectations test as grounds for 
determining design defect in cases involving autonomous vehicle 
technology. This technology is simply too complex and unfamiliar for 
consumer expectations to have developed enough to have any real meaning 
or reasonable application. Utilization of risk-utility balancing is a more 
appropriate means of establishing whether or not a design is defective and 
will encourage manufacturers to continue to develop and implement this 
important technology, which stands to have a truly revolutionary impact on 
automotive safety. 
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